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Many theatregoers, theatre reviewers and literary critics (as well 
as the playwright himself) have been rather dumbfounded by the 
controversy that has come to surround his play, Copenhagen, in the 
United States. For example, Paul Lawrence Rose, an historian, and one of 
the play’s most vehement and determined critics, concluded that 
Copenhagen is: ‘subtle revisionism […] destructive of the integrity of art, 
of science, and of history’.1 In this essay, I will chart the growth of this 
controversy and offer some explanation as to why and how it occurred 
and will discuss the significance of this in terms of a broader, more 
political context. My perspective, is that of a literary critic working in the 
field of contemporary theatre studies, not that of an historian or scientist. 
  
 
Copenhagen is an imaginary series of discussions between three 
historical characters. Two of them, are among the most famous 
theoretical physicists of the 20th Century: Werner Heisenberg, a German 
and Niels Bohr, a Dane. The other character is Margrethe, Bohr’s wife. 
The conversations in the play are revisitations, by their long dead ghosts, 
of a notorious meeting between Bohr and Heisenberg, which took place 
in Nazi-occupied Denmark in 1941. The motive behind Heisenberg’s visit 
to Bohr and what was said, or, was not said, during their meeting remain 
c r i t i c i s m s t e v e n  b a r f i e l d
disputed. The subsequent difference of opinion about both of 
these matters has continued unabated for over 60 years. Heisenberg and 
Bohr were very old friends and long-standing collaborators on many 
ground-breaking discoveries in physics, but Heisenberg was in 1941 a 
leading scientist of Nazi Germany, ostensibly heading their atomic 
weapons research team, while the half-Jewish Bohr was a member of a 
subject nation. Historians and others have argued about both the 
meeting and why Heisenberg made the visit, but there is no doubt, that it 
caused a painful, decisive and permanent break in their close friendship. 
Michael Frayn’s Copenhagen, is the first attempt to turn the actual 
meeting and the disputes about it, into a drama. 
The controversy about Copenhagen began when it was first 
performed in New York (to generally positive reviews in the newspapers, 
and, later, winning awards), and that controversy continues to haunt the 
play even as the play becomes increasingly successful. It summons forth 
numbers of articles condemning and supporting the play, accompanied 
by increasing acrimony and polemic among critics and defenders. In 
addition, there have been several important symposia in the Unites 
States, connected to the play and the historical issues it raises.2 In sharp 
contrast, the play when first produced in Britain was very much a 
surprise success, both commercially and critically. Frayn remarked later: 
‘I thought it unlikely that anyone would want to produce it. I can’t 
remember ever thinking that anyone would come to see it, much less 
have strong views about it’.3 It was originally staged in 1998 at the 
Cottesloe, a small studio theatre on three levels, which is part of the 
Royal National Theatre.4 It won both the 1998 Evening Standard and 
1998 Critics Circle Awards for ‘Best New Play’ and was a critical success, 
as reviews indicate.5 Michael Billington in The Guardian remarked: 
‘Some claim to have been blinded by Frayn’s science. I emerged deeply 
moved by his simultaneous awareness of life’s value and its inexplicable 
mystery’.6 After a short run, the play transferred to the West End’s 
Duchess Theatre where it ran from 5 February 1999 to 7 April 2001. 
Subsequent transfers have remained remarkably consistent with the 
original staging of the play – Michael Blakemore directed both of the 
London productions, as well as the one in New York – which suggests 
that the very different reactions in the United States were not due to a 
directorial reinterpretation. While some British critics certainly realized 
there were issues in the play, they saw these as falling very much within 
the traditional context of plays of ideas that represented science 
and politics, such as Bertolt Brecht’s Galileo or Howard Brenton’s The 
Genius. Duncan Wu, a literary critic, drew attention to this aspect of 
Copenhagen, in his introduction to interviews with Frayn and Michael 
Blakemore (the original director of the play): 
[Copenhagen] seems perfectly to express the anxiety of the West at a 
moment when an increasing number of third world countries are 
acquiring the knowledge and means to construct the bomb. More 
importantly, it dramatizes the dilemma of taking responsibility for such 
acquisitions.7 
In this way, most British reviewers and critics saw the play as 
being about contemporary issues of social responsibility in science, 
rather than about the representation and interpretation of historical 
events. If anything, the historical moment represented by the play was 
regarded as less important than the more specific theme of our political 
responsibility for nuclear weapons. (It is probably significant, here, that 
Britain is a country where the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament has 
always been a powerful social force.) The literary critic Victoria Stewart 
argues that Copenhagen is a criticism of Heisenberg’s belief ‘that science 
could somehow seal itself away from politics’.8 (This thesis is largely 
consistent with the way that plays about science, such as Brecht’s Galileo 
and Brenton’s The Genius depict the problematic relationship between 
scientists and society.) Copenhagen therefore was thought to have staged 
a dialogue between science and theatre whose primary relevance is to 
arguments about today’s world, rather than to those about Bohr’s and 
Heisenberg’s original meeting. I should confess that this is very much 
how I too viewed the play, as a member of the original London audiences 
of both the productions. 
  
 
It was Frayn himself, who first raised the question of the accuracy 
of the scientific and historical contexts, and their importance, in his 
‘Postscript’ to the first Methuen edition of the play, a shortened version of 
which is in the original programme.9 I suspect, that this Postscript was 
designed to make a difficult play understandable, without encumbering 
the dramatic action by excessive exposition: the scientific and 
historical material in the play is displaced into this short essay. Frayn’s 
article cannot be construed as a response to what the British press or 
critics had said, because it predated reviews of the play and no one had 
shown any particular interest in this aspect of the drama. It is not a 
defence after the event, but part of the original conception of the text of 
the play. I remember thinking at the time how long and involved Frayn’s 
account was (it has subsequently been extended and revised in each new 
revised edition of the play, growing from 19 to 54 pages). It is not simply 
an author’s traditional note on sources, but rather an essay that discusses 
the science and history informing the play and, as I shall argue, could be 
perceived as taking sides in an ongoing historical controversy. Frayn 
remarks at the beginning of the Postscript: 
Where a work of fiction features historical characters and historical 
events it’s reasonable to want to know how much if it is fiction and how 
much of it is history. So let me make it as clear as I can in regard to this 
play. 
The central event is a real one. Heisenberg did go to Copenhagen in 1941, 
and there was a meeting with Bohr, in the teeth of all the difficulties 
encountered by my characters. He probably went to dinner at the Bohrs’ 
house, and the two men probably went for a walk to escape from any 
possible microphones, though there is some dispute about even these 
simple matters. The question of what they actually said to each other has 
been even more disputed, and where there’s ambiguity in the play about 
what happened, it’s because there is in the recollection of the 
participants. Much more sustained speculation still has been devoted to 
the question of what Heisenberg was hoping to achieve by the meeting. 
All the alternative and co-existing explications offered in the play, except 
perhaps the final one, have been aired at various times, in one form or 
another.10 
It is worth asking why Frayn, as a playwright, is so concerned to 
establish the validity of the historical context for his play. If, as he claims 
here, there are relatively few facts in this case, why not leave it at that? 
Why is it not enough, to list the range of historical sources that he has 
used to create his work? I can think of no other recent British play based 
on historical events, where an author has been so concerned to clarify 
what is fiction and what is history in their drama, even to the extent of 
discussing and summarising the various historical accounts which have 
informed his play. In fact, Frayn’s remarks, suggest it is at least feasible 
to try to distinguish between those parts of Copenhagen that are 
some kind of direct historical reportage, as opposed to the elements that 
embody the fictional strategy of creating an imaginary work which uses 
real people. This is important, because it leads me to a central part of my 
argument: it is Frayn’s long Postscript to Copenhagen that suggested to 
American historians, that the play should be measured in historical 
terms, not the actual play itself. In discussing the problems of the 
historical record and the disputes between professional historians in this 
Postscript, Frayn has suggested the play is some kind of historical 
account.  
The physicist and historian of science Gerald Holton remarks: ‘[T]
here is of course the danger that the intermingling of playwright, actors, 
physics and history of science, might in some minds strengthen the all-
too-common failing to confuse the play, a work of fiction, with a 
documentary.’11 This may also explain Paul Lawrence Rose’s rather acid 
remark that Frayn, ‘affects to be an entertainer rather than a historian 
(although in his printed Postscript, he likes to play the historian)’.12 
While it certainly doesn’t help Rose’s argument to imply that literature is 
merely entertainment when compared to history, nonetheless he is 
responding to an authorial Postscript that encourages a reading of 
Copenhagen as some form of statement about historical events, even if 
that statement is that these historical events cannot be known 
objectively. In addition, Frayn does much more to invite such rejoinders 
from historians. Frayn suggests, for example, there is some fundamental 
contiguity between what he terms the ‘storyteller’ and ‘historian’.  
The great challenge facing the story teller and the historian alike is to get 
inside people’s heads, to stand where they stood and see the world as 
they saw it, to make some informed estimate of their motives and 
intentions – and this is precisely where recorded and recordable history 
cannot reach.13 
Now, while this parallel between historian and imaginative writer 
is meaningful in various ways, not least because both employ narrative, 
in another sense it is problematic. The ‘storyteller’ (or in Frayn’s case the 
dramatist), is not primarily concerned with historical objectivity, or 
debates over primary and secondary sources, as modern historians are. 
Historians such as Paul Lawrence Rose would be unlikely to regard their 
work as requiring imagination, to ‘get inside people’s heads’, because 
there is an area beyond the range of ‘recordable history’. I suspect that 
Rose would be unwilling to accept the implication of Frayn’s 
argument that the storyteller takes over the role of the historian when 
orthodox history is no longer possible. In addition, the question is crucial 
of whether there are indeed facts in the case of the real Heisenberg’s visit 
to Bohr. There is no agreement among historians of an absence of facts 
about this final private meeting between Bohr and Heisenberg, despite 
Frayn’s suggestion at the beginning of his Postscript (above). Instead, 
many historians, for instance Rose and Holton, would argue that there 
are clear facts upon which an objective analysis of Heisenberg’s 
behaviour and intentions can be made. Rose’s reaction in this respect is 
telling: he takes Frayn to be ignoring historical facts because he [Frayn] 
wishes to, not because. to Rose’s mind, there are none available. Rose 
asks: ‘What influences have led Frayn to shun the fairly straightforward 
historical and moral facts of the Heisenberg story in favor of his own 
peculiar interpretation?’14 
Most problematic of all, is that Frayn’s Postscript appears to 
maintain an inconsistent stance. He criticises some historians’ depictions 
of Heisenberg, while endorsing others’, but simultaneously suggests this 
is not borne out in the play itself. For example, Frayn implies that an 
earlier article by Paul Lawrence Rose (in 1984) suffers from bias against 
Heisenberg (which may explain why Copenhagen drew such a furious 
response from Rose). Frayn suggests that Rose’s article assumes a lack of 
sympathy with Heisenberg that is manifest throughout, though Frayn 
does not either engage with its line of argument or use of evidence 
directly. He argues that Rose’s paper, ‘takes a remarkably high moral 
tone. […] he talked about Heisenberg’s “guff”, his “self-serving, self-
deluding claims” and his “elementary moral stupidity”.’15 This is clearly a 
criticism of sorts, by Frayn, of Rose’s argument, which itself is 
representative of the dominant perspective among historians: that 
Heisenberg gave a deliberately erroneous view of his meeting with Bohr. 
Heisenberg, according to this argument, consciously did this after World 
War II, to suggest he was an unwilling participant in Hitler’s atomic 
weapons project.  
Frayn goes on in the subsequent revised version of the Postscript 
in 2002, to make similar objections to Rose’s book, Heisenberg and the 
Nazi Atomic Bomb Project. Frayn wryly observes that this might have 
been ‘handwritten in green ink’, so strong is the ‘contempt for 
Heisenberg’.16 Although Frayn does not criticise Rose’s arguments, this 
suggests that he considers Rose’s work to be flawed by its attitude 
to Heisenberg. In contrast, the dissenting historical thesis is that of 
Thomas Powers’ HEISENBERG’S WAR. Powers tries to rehabilitate exactly 
the analysis of Heisenberg’s behaviour that historians such as Rose have 
dismissed as a post-war fabrication by Heisenberg himself. Powers goes 
further and suggests that Heisenberg may have deliberately sabotaged 
the German atomic bomb project, by withholding key information. 
(Thomas Powers is a journalist by profession, rather than an academic 
historian.) Frayn makes his own preference clear, referring to Powers’ 
book as, ‘remarkable … generous in its understanding’.17 
This makes Frayn’s later remark appear disingenuous, when he 
states: ‘The play is not an attempt to adjudicate between these differing 
views of Heisenberg’s personality, or these differing accounts of his 
activities’.18 Frayn’s Postscript, therefore, endorses Power’s argument as 
being better, in some sense, than that of many historians (one can only 
read ‘generous in its understanding’ as referring to Power’s attitude to 
Heisenberg), which suggests that Power’s book is the main source for 
Copenhagen. Yet, Frayn simultaneously asserts that the play itself, is not 
favouring Power’s standpoint on Heisenberg over that of a historian such 
as Rose. It is not surprising, that for many historians this is at best 
confusing! 
  
I think what Frayn is implying here (this is discussed in more 
detail below), is that in order to create the complex and ambiguous 
character of the fictional Heisenberg in Copenhagen, he needed an 
account such as that of Powers. A play based on Rose’s account of 
Heisenberg, for example, while it may be closer to the historical facts of 
the matter, would have a central character who an audience could have 
no sympathy with whatsoever, and would make it impossible to develop 
Copenhagen’s dramatic themes. Furthermore, the play itself does offer 
sharply contrasting views of such matters through the characters 
themselves, rather than by means of a framework of authorial meaning 
(as, say, a history book would use). Plays can do this, while essays can’t. 
The character of Margrethe (as Frayn also tells us in the Post-Postscript 
of the revised play) is sceptical throughout Copenhagen of Heisenberg’s 
claims, and her attitude is closest to that of historians such as Rose and 
Holton.19 She undermines exactly the kind of arguments on behalf of 
Heisenberg that someone like Thomas Powers makes. The 
fictitious ‘Heisenberg’ that Frayn creates, lies closer to Power’s account, 
because that book is much more favourable to the way that the real 
Heisenberg presented himself and his actions, in his own comments. 
Copenhagen’s Heisenberg couldn’t represent himself in the same way 
that Rose’s interpretation of Heisenberg does, as people are seldom so 
hostile to themselves.  
To sum up then, it is likely that Copenhagen’s critics such as Paul 
Rose and Gerald Holton saw the play as direct intervention in an existing 
historical dispute (about Heisenberg’s meeting with Bohr and what the 
former said subsequently about that meeting) because of Frayn’s 
Postscript, and then read the play as framed by that same Postscript. For 
historians such as Rose, Holton and others, Powers’ HEISENBERG’S WAR is 
not simply a wrong interpretation of history, but is misleading and 
dangerous, because it ends up defending Heisenberg by accepting 
Heisenberg’s own revisionary, self-exculpatory account of his meeting 
with Bohr. By implication, therefore, acceptance of this argument would 
mean tolerating a presentation of Heisenberg’s wartime activities in a 
much more favourable light than they deserve. Frayn’s Postscript would 
thus appear to suggest that Copenhagen does have some kind of 
historical validity (albeit in a way that is hazy and not about objectivity) 
and prefers one particular position and source (that of Powers’ book) to 
those views of the majority of historians. 
In addition, Frayn argues there is a strong relationship between 
drama and history, which would imply that Copenhagen as drama is a 
kind of history (though exactly what kind is obscure). In turn, it is 
reasonable for historians such as Rose to regard Frayn’s ‘Postscript’ (and 
hence the play) as criticising their own arguments, in terms they would 
consider misinformed, and reliant on a single and very contested source 
(Powers’ HEISENBERG’S WAR). For Rose and Holton, even a refusal to 
adjudicate between differing views of Heisenberg would itself be taking a 
stance closer to Powers’ view than their own. As Rose argues: ‘For the 
central facts of the visit are really not in doubt, even if some people like 
Frayn refuse to face them’.20 
Further evidence that Frayn sees Copenhagen as some form of 
history that needs to be accurate is provided by later revisions to the text 
and the production of a ‘Post-Postscript’, which considers questions of 
historical validity even further, while defending Copenhagen against the 
charges levelled by several historians. Frayn writes that: 
With hindsight, I think I accept some of these criticisms. I should 
perhaps have had Heisenberg justify Germany’s war aims on the Eastern 
front directly, instead of having Bohr refer to his arguments in one angry 
but passing aside. I should perhaps have found some way to make the 
parallel with all the other trips that were found offensive, and about 
whose purpose there was none of the mystery which had seemed to 
attach to the one in Copenhagen.21 
  
 
However, I do think we have to separate the actual play from the 
author’s Postscript, because they are very different kinds of texts. Specific 
genres of written language require dissimilar methods of reading and 
create meaning in particular ways. Historical drama may rely on history, 
but audiences do not receive it in the same way as history. Are 
Shakespeare’s Henry V and Macbeth without value, because they bear 
little or no resemblance to historical fact? Do they therefore have nothing 
relevant to tell us about the relationships between society, individuals 
and politics? I think the answers here are both ‘no’: Frayn’s Copenhagen 
requires examination in the same terms as other dramas based on 
historical events. Whatever the issues raised by Frayn’s Postscript (and I 
do have some sympathy for the historians who have responded to Frayn 
over this matter), it really isn’t the same genre of text as a play and 
should not be read as a framing device that would turn Copenhagen into 
some form of direct historical commentary. Frayn has unintentionally 
made this potential confusion worse because of the Postscript and his 
argument that distinguishing between dramatic fact and fiction is not 
only possible, but also a useful and appropriate thing to do. This invokes 
criticism by historians.  
However, many theatregoers may never read the text of the play, 
let alone the author’s written Postscript. For an audience, the 
performance of the text is what matters and where meaning is located. 
Whereas an authorial Postscript can have the same univocal intention 
that an objective historical account may possess, for drama to be 
successful it must allow multiple and conflicting interpretations to be 
drawn out by directors, actors and audiences that exceed any singular 
authorial intention. No single character has to posses an ultimately 
objective and omniscient view of the whole play. Richness and 
three-dimensionality in dramatic characterisation result in motivation 
that is as complex and unconscious as in actual human behaviour. Nor is 
Copenhagen a straightforwardly realist play, insofar as it does not try to 
directly recreate the real-world meeting that took place in 1941 Denmark, 
between three actual people: Bohr, his wife Margrethe and Heisenberg. 
Instead, the play stages an imaginary conversation between ghosts in 
some Dantean limbo, who are condemned continually to ‘redraft’ their 
report of their meeting, to see if they can finally understand and agree on 
what happened and what it meant. The three characters, Bohr, 
Margrethe, Heisenberg, have hindsight about the events they are trying 
to understand. Historians do not write about what ghosts might think or 
say, and this dramatic device distances us from the idea that the play is 
an attempted recreation of actual, historical events. 
For Frayn’s critics, the problem is that drama cannot be read in 
the same way as a text can be read, with a single, intended meaning. 
Jonathan Logan, a physicist and historian of science, in a review of 
Copenhagen in American Scientist reads one of Heisenberg’s final 
speeches as if it were an essay. 
BOHR: Heisenberg, I have to say – if people are to be measured strictly 
in terms of observable quantities … 
HEISENBERG: Then should need a strange new quantum ethics. There’d 
be a place in heaven for me. And another one for the SS man I met on my 
way home from Haigerloch. That was the end of my war.22 
Logan reads this speech as though the exhausted Heisenberg is 
being completely sincere at this point in the play. Logan believes it should
be taken at face value, and that this in turn represents what the 
playwright wishes the audience to think. Logan argues: ‘So fast and so far 
does Frayn take us, this somehow is not meant to shock. Losing sight of 
the moral horizon can make you feel giddy – or sick.’23 
Frayn’s rejoinder on this point is perfectly reasonable:  
Even harder to credit was the reaction in some quarters to the “strange 
new quantum ethics” proposed by the fictitious Heisenberg. I suppose I 
should have erected a flashing ‘IRONY’ sign in front of it.24 
Logan’s criticism is therefore problematic, because he does not 
recognise the critical strategies necessary for reading the words of a 
character in a play, but assumes the whole piece should be read, as 
if it possessed the coherency of a thesis. Nor is Logan much concerned 
with context: these characters are clearly not in Heaven, and it is hard to 
imagine even the most forgiving God making a special place in the after-
life for the SS! The speech is Heisenberg’s attempt at a somewhat anxious 
and wan joke, combined with the even more desperate hope that he 
might just be remembered more favourably by history than his actions 
would permit. However, he is intelligent enough to know that this will 
never happen, as he remarks several times throughout the play. A few 
lines earlier than the speech Logan quotes, Heisenberg remarks to Bohr 
that: ‘You were a good man, from first to last, and no one could ever say 
otherwise. Whereas I …’25 Even if Logan had not seen the performance 
(he seems to have written a review of the text of the play), he rather 
mistakes the tone of this speech. Audiences are composed of many 
individuals, but it would seem surprising that so many reviewers had 
failed to see the ending of the play as the authorial sanctioned apology for 
Heisenberg that Logan perceives it to be. 
Plays represent a multiplicity of different and competing voices 
and characters have their own individualised viewpoints of themselves 
and the dramatic action. It is misleading for the North American critics of 
the play to read individual characters as if they endorsed some supposed 
authorial view. These critics seem convinced, on reading the Postscript, 
that Frayn intends Heisenberg to be a kind of heroic protagonist; and so, 
they read the play as biased towards him. That much of what Heisenberg 
says is undercut by his historical behaviour as exemplified in the play 
simply doesn’t occur to them. It is not easy to see the character of 
Heisenberg as heroic, when after all; he is a willing member of the Nazi 
party. He doesn’t fly into exile, nor does he actively oppose the Nazi 
regime. He himself remarks in a speech: ‘I’ve never claimed to be a 
hero’.26 Heisenberg accepts on many occasions that his actions are 
flawed, whatever his intentions. Even when he does not, Margarethe is 
always there to continually undercut his position and his interpretations 
of his behaviour. 
MARGARETHE: No! When he first came in 1924 he was a humble 
assistant lecturer from a humiliated nation, grateful to have a job. Now 
here you are, back in triumph – the leading scientist in a nation that’s 




However, beneath many of the criticisms of Copenhagen there is a 
buried assumption, with a more subtle argument: Anything that raises 
the possibility of Bohr’s culpability (however minor and marginal) in the 
production of the atom bomb and its eventual use as weapon must be 
dismissed at all costs. Therefore, I would argue, the attacks on what is 
taken to be the (positive) misrepresentation of Heisenberg in the play are 
often causally linked to defences against the possibility of an 
accompanying (negative) misrepresentation of Bohr in Copenhagen. As 
Paul Lawrence Rose states:  
It is simply monstrous to draw or imply a moral symmetry between Bohr 
and his disciple. Niels Bohr was a man of the most intense moral 
awareness, whose integrity has been universally recognized.28 
In addition, these criticisms regarding the way Bohr is presented 
in Copenhagen are associated with an anxiety that Frayn’s play implies 
some type of criticism of Allied work on / use of the atom bomb. Logan 
makes this critical stance clear in his review: 
By the play’s elegiac conclusion, the audience has been led … to accept a 
thoroughly manipulated version of Heisenberg … [who] had ‘never 
managed to contribute to the death of one single solitary person.’ Bohr, 
by contrast, is charged with complicity in the human disaster of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki.29 
By wrenching this line out of its dramatic context, Logan elides the 
fact that this quotation comes from a speech given by a rueful Bohr, in 
response to Heisenberg, who has just stated: ‘You were a good man, from 
first to last, and no one could ever say otherwise.’30 However, Bohr in 
this scene, is both trying to comfort the distraught Heisenberg, who they 
both know will go down in history as a willing servant of an evil regime – 
as is inevitable – and also speaking as a man of conscience and 
responsibility should do when faced with the horror of nuclear weapons 
and the trauma they have inflicted on civilisation. 
It is important to remember that the conversations in the play 
occur in an imaginary space beyond any specific historical moment, 
which allows them to have contemporary relevance. The characters are 
not interested only in the history of the atom bomb in World War 
II, but also the subsequent threat nuclear weapons pose to humanity. 
Nevertheless, what is striking about Logan’s argument is his 
description of the fate of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as a ‘human disaster’. 
This phrase is problematic, because it suggests that the premeditated use 
of weapons of mass destruction against a civilian population (whether 
justified or not) is much like the unintended accident of the meltdown of 
Chernobyl. These things are both certainly ‘disasters’, with regard to their 
consequences, but bombs are intended to have that effect. They are not 
just disasters for human being, they are disasters meant by human 
beings. For Logan to define the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 
this way is to remove them from the realm of political, scientific and 
military decision-making, and thus offer a form of defence against 
criticisms of those who actually made such decisions. Logan’s argument 
therefore shies away from the necessity of thinking through science’s 
ethical responsibility towards humankind. 
That inability stands as the polar opposite to the discussion and 
speeches of Heisenberg, Bohr and Margrethe in Copenhagen. These three 
ghosts are obliged to revisit their past, because the creation of nuclear 
weapons has consequences that still matter to us today. If one of 
Margrethe’s roles in the play is, as we have seen, to challenge 
Heisenberg’s perspective, another is to remind the audience continually 
that physicists helped create the atomic bombs that killed people – and 
might still do so.  
MARGARETHE: [W]hat it came down to in the end, all that shining 
springtime in the 1920s, that’s what it produced – a more efficient 
machine for killing people.’31 
From a European point of view, one sees a kind of American 
‘exceptionalism’ at work here in such criticisms as those by Rose, Logan 
and Holton. The Manhattan Project is remembered as a heroic narrative 
and eschatology centring on (and culminating) in American military and 
scientific success, with little accompanying public debate about nuclear 
weapons – or the actual bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This 
narrative is part of a surprisingly resolute faith in science and technology 
as the paradigmatic solution to the world’s problems. Thus, lying behind 
the arguments of many of Copenhagen’s critics, is an extreme reluctance 
to accept any comment that might appear to criticise scientists and the 
accepted history of the atom bomb project. This assumption 
includes repressing any linkage of that heroic narrative to the actual use 
of nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and, equally, keenly 
desires to avoid connecting the historical moment of Copenhagen to 
current concerns.  
Paul Lawrence Rose fears that the play misrepresents Heisenberg 
to the detriment of Bohr. He argues, as we have seen above, that the play 
is a ‘vicious denigration’ of Bohr ‘the good man’, as a transference of 
Heisenberg’s real guilt onto Bohr. The fictitious Heisenberg projects his 
very real guilt at having tried to develop an atom bomb for Hitler onto 
Bohr, by emphasising Bohr’s involvement in the (successful) work at Los 
Alamos, as opposed to the failure of Heisenberg’s own attempt to build 
an atom bomb. By this, Heisenberg makes his failure obscure his less-
than-laudable original intentions. According to Rose, Bohr ‘only [joined 
the Atom Bomb project] after his serious ethical misgivings about such a 
weapon had been overcome by consideration of the immediate evil 
presented by Nazism.’32 
Perhaps aware that most audiences (and the theatre reviewers) 
would miss this subtle play of transferred guilt, and, instead, feel that the 
character of Bohr is presented in the play as both moral and virtuous, 
Rose decides to raise the stakes. The Bohr of Copenhagen, he claims, (he 
offers no textual evidence from the play to support this assertion) is a 
‘self-absorbed prig, indifferent to the births and welfare of his own 
children.33 As he believes the play favours Heisenberg to the detriment of 
Bohr, then inevitably this means it must offer characterisations that 
would support such views. 
But does Rose’s interpretation of Bohr’s character in Copenhagen 
make any sense in terms of the play? In Copenhagen, Bohr is continually 
haunted by the loss of his son Christian in a boating accident. Bohr (and 
Margrethe, his wife) suffer repetitive anguish because of this trauma, and 
it is deeply mysterious to this reader, as to how a member of the audience 
could fail to be moved by their evident suffering, and by the 
accompanying eerie sound of the gulls’ forlorn calls in the performance. 
BOHR: And once again I see those same few moments that I see every 
day. 
HEISENBERG: Those short moments on the boat, when the tiller slams 
over in the heavy sea, and Christian is falling 
BOHR: If I hadn’t let him take the helm … 
HEISENBERG: Those long moments in the water. 
BOHR: Those endless moments in the water.34
 
Are this really the words of a ‘self absorbed prig, indifferent to the 
births and welfare of his own children’, as Rose interprets the character 
of Bohr to be? 
Rose also argues that the play suggests that the Allies and the 
Nazis are morally equivalent (again, he offers no textual evidence from 
the play to support this idea). As Rose argues:  
Everyone, then, is seen to be guilty, and so everyone is blameless. There 
is no difference between the Gestapo and British intelligence. The British 
bombing of Dresden and Berlin is as bad as Hitler’s Blitz on British and 
Polish civilians. Churchill and Roosevelt are amoral power–wielders, just 
like Hitler (another Heisenberg glibness), and so on.35 
This is an attempt on Rose’s part to widen the parameters of the 
debate, regarding his assertion of the presumed similarities between 
Bohr and Heisenberg implied in Copenhagen, into a much larger 
historical arena. In fact, the play doesn’t really suggest such an 
equivalence: it is the Nazis, who are attempting to round up Danish 
Jewry and transport them to concentration camps, Hitler who is 
described (by Bohr) as a ‘homicidal maniac’. The persecution of the Jews, 
which features so prominently in the play, was the action of a vicious, 
racist regime, which committed appalling acts of genocide without even a 
pretence of military justification. I think it very unlikely, that a British or 
European audience could ever be convinced of any general moral 
equivalence between the Nazis and the Allies. Perhaps an American 
audience could be, but somehow I doubt this.  
What Rose must therefore be repressing in his argument, is that 
the only possible moral parallel between the Allies and the Nazis 
established in Copenhagen turns on the scientific development (as it 
turns out, unsuccessfully, in the case of the German project) of atomic 
weapons. This in turn leads to the responsibility for their production and 
use, by those who possess them. As Margrethe says bitterly, speaking as 
much of our present, as of the past: ‘And this wonderful machine may yet 
kill every man, woman and child in the world.’36 Margrethe, (whom 
neither Rose or Logan pay much attention to) represents the voice of 
those who are less concerned about the original justifications of the 
development and use of atomic weapons in World War II, than about the 
consequences. This voice does not suggest the Allies are morally 
equivalent to the Nazi regime, but neither does it let them off the moral 
hook of responsibility for developing atomic weapons nor their 
first use of them. One problem with the accounts by Copenhagen’s critics, 
such as those of Rose and Logan, is that they, perhaps unconsciously, 
elide Margrethe’s voice and, therefore, elide what it represents. 
  
 
Perhaps most disturbing in Rose’s argument is his suggestion that 
the play contains an implicit anti-Semitism, or at least an uncritical 
reflection of such (although he doesn’t seem able to bring himself to say 
this directly). This is evinced, to his mind, by both the play’s 
misrepresentation of the half-Jewish Bohr, as already discussed, but also 
by what Rose regards as a crucial moment in the play’s structure of 
transferring culpability from Heisenberg (who was engaged in military 
research, however unsuccessfully, for what we would all agree was an evil 
regime) to others. For Rose, Heisenberg’s guilt is therefore transferred to 
Bohr and in exactly the same way, Rose suggests, that guilt for atomic 
weapons is located at the door of Jewish scientists.  
The Allies in general, and the Jews too; after all, as Frayn’s play points 
out – in a moment that stuns a New York audience – the true inventors of 
the bomb, Otto Frisch and Rudolf Peierls, were Jews.37 
Frayn’s recent reply to this is worth quoting in full. 
Other criticisms I found extremely difficult to make sense of — some even 
to credit. Professor Rose, who detected the subtle revisionism of the play, 
found a particularly sinister significance in one detail — the fictitious 
Heisenberg’s remarking upon the neatness of the historical irony 
whereby the crucial calculation (of the critical mass), which persuaded 
the Allies of the possibility of building a nuclear weapon, was made by a 
German and an Austrian, driven into exile in Britain because they were 
Jewish. Professor Rose saw this as an attempt to blame “the Jews” for the 
bomb’s invention.38 
Rose has recently renewed some elements of his charge, while 
modifying others. 
Finally, there is the question of implicit anti-Semitism — not of Mr. 
Frayn, of course, but of Heisenberg and others. At page 83 of his US 
edition, Mr. Frayn has Heisenberg state that the crucial calculation for a 
bomb was done by Frisch and Peierls in England, instead of “for us” in 
Germany. Then: 
MARGARETHE: Because they were Jews. 
HEISENBERG: There’s something almost mathematically elegant about 
that. 
Whatever his faults as a historian, Mr. Frayn is too experienced a 
playwright to be unaware of the impact this implication has on 
audiences, whether Jewish or not.39 
I think there are several points to make here. First, this is quite an 
intriguing use of rhetoric by Rose, even if not very substantial as 
evidence. Why exactly are New York audiences stunned? We only have 
the words of Rose to testify to this. Exactly how does one decide an 
audience is stunned, or, for that matter, what stunned them? Is Rose 
suggesting American audiences are less well-informed than others, and 
thus had no idea that the Nazi persecution of the Jews had forced Jewish 
physicists, like so many other groups, to flee from Germany? The Nazis’ 
obsessive racial policies often worked to their own detriment, as for 
example in the Ukraine, and elsewhere, where the German army were 
welcomed as liberators but quickly turned their possible Slavic allies into 
enemies. 
More worrying however, is the relentlessness of Rose’s attempt to 
turn history into a question of individuals, whether Jewish or not. It was 
clearly, the United States’ decisive advantage in military-industrial terms 
and political will that made the Manhattan Project work. Some scientists 
were Jewish, others were not: but they were a determining factor, insofar 
as they helped convince the Allies to make the huge commitment of 
resources to realise the atomic bomb and provided the theory. They are 
not the end, or the only important part of the story.  
Let us return to the play for a moment. What happens in the scene 
quoted above is, in fact, Heisenberg’s sudden realization that Nazi anti-
Semitism contributed to Germany’s downfall, and that he had been quite 
blind to this before. Margrethe is forcing him to recognise it. The sudden 
symmetry he discovers is his recognition of something he had been 
largely unaware of. This mathematical elegance is equivalent to poetic 
justice. Such statements are consistent with the characterisation of 
Heisenberg throughout Copenhagen as a flawed, sometimes thoughtless, 
often stubbornly naïve individual. However, this should not distract us 
from the point that both scientists as individuals and science as 
whole, bear moral responsibility for what they, and it, help others to 
achieve. Rose’s argument, because of its particular focus, effectively 
obscures the more general issues of both scientific and social 
responsibility for atomic weapons and successive generations of weapons 
of mass destruction. 
This is not to say however, that Rose does not have a valid 
historical point when he claims that the twin reasons pushing the Allied 
atomic bomb project were a desire to win the war against Germany and a 
fear that there was an equivalent Nazi attempt at development of such 
weapons.40 But, it doesn’t remove the more general questions the play 
poses, about scientific responsibility to society, and the consequences of 
such actions. If we focus, as Rose does, on the reason for the production 
of atomic weapons to the exclusion of their consequences, then we fail to 
see the outcome: tens of thousands of civilians deaths and countless 




Though not in the way he intends, Paul Lawrence Rose may be 
right to attack Copenhagen for being ‘destructive of the integrity of art, of 
science, and of history’. If, that is to say, by the ‘integrity’ of science he 
means that the play refuses to seal science off conveniently from society 
and its responsibility towards human beings, indeed, from the urgency of 
thinking of science as an ethical or political activity. Frayn’s play succeeds 
as drama, in part, because it challenges such a view of science as a 
hermetically-closed endeavour. Copenhagen returns science from the 
ordered discourse of scientists and their historians to the anxieties and 
concerns of ordinary people. 
Copenhagen is also a critique of the integrity of a ‘history’, as it 
suggests a history that is no more than a desire to accurately record what 
happened in the past is a historicism that fails to engage with the 
vicissitudes of the present. We might instead prefer to see Copenhagen as 
opening up a dialogue between the dead and the living, and between the 
historical, the present and the future. As Walter Benjamin wrote in ‘The 
Theses on History’: ‘For every image of the past that is not recognized by 
the present as one of its own concerns threatens to disappear 
irretrievably’.41 
Art often needs to be destructive of the supposed integrity of 
academic disciplines, in the pursuit of a wider remit: an obligation to 
question accepted ideas and assumptions. Nor is Heisenberg’s final 
speech, which ends upon the line, ‘the final core of uncertainty at the 
heart of things’, in the last analysis ‘banal’, as Rose asserts.42 Uncertainty 
is also about possibility: in this case, that which links the future to the 
past, for good and ill. It serves to remind us that what joins our 
preservation with others’ annihilation is now contingency. We all now 
share that same fate created by the development of the atomic bomb, 
which is that our preservation is fraught with the possibility of our 
annihilation. This is why Heisenberg imagines history might have 
happened differently, if he had done his calculations correctly: London, 
or Paris, or Copenhagen, might have suffered the destruction of 
Hiroshima or Nagasaki. The point is to make an audience feel and 
question this possibility, while remembering that life’s intrinsic 
importance and essential strangeness, are part of what makes it worth 
preserving. Margrethe is significantly, both a woman and a non-scientist, 
her voice is therefore closer to that of ordinary people caught up in such 
events. She doesn’t accept many of Heisenberg’s attempted explanations 
of his behaviour, but nor does she buy into the myth of a pure science 
without any consequences for humanity. She sums up towards the end of 
the play, what the atomic bomb meant in more human terms. 
MARGARETHE: And when all our eyes are closed, when even the ghosts 
have gone, what will be left of our beloved world? Our ruined and 
dishonoured and beloved world?43 
This deliberately echoes a similar elegiac comment made by 
Heisenberg about Germany a few lines earlier: ‘My ruined and 
dishonoured and beloved homeland’. Heisenberg puts into words how 
much Nazism has cost Germany, in terms of a ruin that is as much ethical 
as economic, it is dishonoured by what has been done in its name. 
Margrethe, however, rephrases this to include the whole world, 
emphasising the ruinous price paid by everyone in ethical, political and 
human terms, for the development and use of the atomic bomb. 
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